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'Tis a gift to be simple
'Tis a gift to be free
'Tis a gift to come down to where we ought to be1
INTRODUCTION
There is a paradox in professional responsibility education today.2
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1. Simple Gifts, in GO IN AND OUT THE WINDOW, AN ILLUSTRATED SONGBOOK FOR YOUNG
PEOPLE 120 (Dan Fox ed., 1987). "This old Shaker hymn expresses the belief that to be pure
in heart and true to oneself, or, 'simple' as the Shakers would say, is the greatest gift." Id
2. Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A CurricularParadox,
1 AxM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 247,274-75 (1979) (defining professional responsibility as "a curricular
paradox"). Professor Pipkin's point was that while many in the legal profession and the
organized bar perceived professional responsibility education to be very important for producing
ethical lawyers, both the manner in which it was taught in law schools and the subject matter
chosen for emphasis defeated the goal of having law students take it seriously. Id at 274.
Rather, law students perceived professional responsibility and education as a low status course
in the law school's implicit learning hierarchy and, therefore, came to believe that professional
ethics was not important to lawyering. Id at 265, 274-75. Professor Pipkin argued that law
school ethics instruction as it was then was self-defeating. Id. at 274. "Ethical instruction in legal
education ... must be destroyed in its present form in order to be saved." Id. The self-
defeating modes of instruction that he identified may continue to characterize at least some
teaching of professional responsibility today. See, ag., William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal
Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65-66 (1991) [hereinafter Simon, Trouble with Legal Ethics]
(describing predominant methods of teaching legal ethics as disappointing, boring, dispiriting
and insubstantial). I think, however, that there has been substantial improvement in our efforts.
See infra note 27.
I mean to highlight a different paradox in this Article. In response to a perceived crisis in
professionalism, the organized bar continues to call for enhanced attention to professional
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For the past twenty years or so, professional concern for declining
values has prompted repeated calls for increased attention to teaching
professional responsibility in law schools.' The object of these calls
is to restore ethical behavior in legal practice. But, at the same time
that law schools have been called on to intensify their focus on ethics
education, there is growing appreciation that it is workplace experi-
ences that have the greatest impact on shaping professional behav-
ior.4 Ethical education may be eclipsed if law students encounter
workplaces that are unsympathetic to ethical practice. Complicating
the problem is a widespread perception that commercial pressures
have transformed workplaces formerly congenial to training in values,
however modest, into soulless businesses, indifferent or actively hostile
to ethical practice. The declining emphasis on professional values in
the workplace makes our job in law school both more difficult and
more important.
If our educational efforts are to make a contribution to the revival
of professionalism,' our teaching should be informed by an apprecia-
responsibility education in law school. Yet, there is growing recognition of the impact that
workplace experiences have on professional behavior, particularly those experiences that occur
early in a lawyer's career. If those experiences depart substantially from what students come to
expect about lawyering from law school, the impact of law school education is likely to be
diminished or overwhelmed. The paradox, in my view, is to emphasize law school ethics
instruction as a remedy for declining standards of professional behavior without understanding
that workplace experiences will have the predominant effect on actual behavior.
3. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM," .... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE:" ABLUEPRINT FORTHE REIuNDLNG OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 16 (1986) [hereinafter
STANLEY REPORT] (recommending that law schools give attention to teaching of ethics and
include discussions of professionalism and ethics throughout curriculum); TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOP-
MENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 235 (1992) [hereinafter THE MACCRATE REPORT] (noting
that "[1]aw schools also have an important, and varied role to play in developing the skill of
'recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas"'); Bryant G. Garth &Joanne Martin, Law Schools
and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469, 502-03 (1993) [hereinafter Garth &
Martin, Construction of Competence) (noting improved teaching of professional ethics in response
to widespread fears of decline in professional standards); Lawrence K. Hellman, TheEffects of Law
Office Work on the Formation of Law Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation,
Optimization, 4 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 537-38 (1991) (observing that legal education is often
seen as both cause and solution to decline of professionalism).
4. See Hellman, supra note 3, at 539-45; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method,
42 J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 42-48 (1992) [hereinafter Rhode, The Pervasive Method]. See generally,
Daniel J. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work. An Empirical Study of Legal Internship, 45 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1, 2 nn.2-3 (1995) (suggesting that work experiences of law students are
"educationally rich" and that students learn by doing).
5. Professionalism is an elusive notion. In this Article, I use the term professionalism to
mean fidelity to one's own informed sense of right and wrong. Because I believe that one's
internal sense must be informed, my notion of professionalism encompasses attention to formal
rules of professional conduct and adherence to basic community standards of decency. I believe
that lawyers ought to interpret these rules and norms to be consistent with their own internal
sense of morality and act accordingly. Therefore, I ordinarily use the terms "ethical," "moral,"
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tion for the dominant role that the culture and values of the
workplace have on the way that lawyers behave professionally. The
challenge for us today is to determine how to assist our students in
reconciling aspirations for an improved profession with the current
realities of practice.6 What messages should we convey to our
students about legal practice if we are to help them to develop a
desire to behave professionally, while giving them a realistic sense of
the pressures that make the achievement of that ideal difficult?
7
This Article suggests that the emphasis by the organized bar on a
unitary profession with a dominant conception of practice is counter-
productive.8 By promoting the ideal that there is a uniform vision of
professional lawyering to which law students should aspire, the bar's
unitary conception of the profession undermines the revival of
professionalism it seeks to encourage. The bar's approach implies an
ethic of obedience rather than personal responsibility.' It discourag-
and "professional" interchangeably. I believe that I share the views of others in using the terms
in this way. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2d ed. 1995)
(treating terms "ethical" and "moral" as synonymous because there is no important difference
between them); Daniel R. Coquillette, Pmfessionalism: The Deep Theory, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1271,
1272 (1994), reprinted in DANIEL R. COQUILLETE, LAWYERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 314-18 (1995). Professor Coquilette suggests that "[ilt is a delusion of young,
inexperienced lawyers to think that they can separate their personal from their professional lives
and their personal from their professional morality.... You cannot be a bad person and a
good lawyer, nor can you be a good person and a lawyer with sharp practices." Id. See generally
Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal
Profession [hereinafter Nelson &Trubek, New Problems], inLAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 1, 5 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992)
[hereinafter LAkiEs' IDEALS] (defining professionalism as "the set of norms, traditions, and
practices that lawyers have constructed to establish and maintain their identities as professionals
and their jurisdiction over legal work"); Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 33
(observing that commonly shared perceptions both inside and outside legal profession fuel
debate over professional responsibility).
6. Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 33 (stating that "[u]ntil we come to a
clearer understanding of the capacities and limitations of professional responsibility education
in universities, we will miss opportunities for inspiring greater professional responsibility in
practice").
7. This dissonance is inherently uncomfortable. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Wanted: An
Ethos of Personal Responsibili y-Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't MakeforEthicalLawyers,
21 CONN. L. REv. 365, 381 (1989) (stating that "[c]riticizing the profession one is working so
hard to enter is an inevitably unpalatable task"). This discomfort apparently was the impetus
for Professor Anthony T. Kronman's recent book. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION vii (1993) (discussing conference where he was
confronted with question whether practicing lawyers' requirement to engage in persuasive
advocacy corrupted their desire for truth and, if so, how he, in good conscience, could continue
to train lawyers for practice).
8. See, e.g., THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 (emphasizing need for law schools
and bar to work together in identifying skills and values that are critical to professional
development of lawyers).
9. See generally Rebecca T. Alpert, Ethical Decision Making: A Reconstructionist Framework,
REcONSTRUCrIONIST,June 1985, at 15 (criticizing rule-based approach to ethical decisionmaking
for limiting individuals' freedom and responsibility to make moral choices).
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es students from understanding that they have significant power to
choose and create a legal identity that is congenial with their personal
orientation and their values.
Instead, I propose that we openly proclaim the variety and diversity
of professional work" so our students can seek a practice that fits
their personal styles and utilizes their skills." They should not leave
law school believing that there is a single conception of being a good
lawyer that requires them to suppress their best instincts.' In their
search for a practice that suits them, they should be guided by the
understanding that questions of ethics are profound and difficult.
They should not be reluctant or shy about raising those questions.
Because the circumstances of their work and the context in which
ethical questions arise will significantly influence the resolution of
questions of professional behavior, beginning lawyers should seek out
mentors in practice with whom it is possible to discuss ethical
questions. Moreover, they should have confidence in using their own
moral intuitions and ordinary sense of decency to assist in recognizing
and resolving those questions. I believe that these themes should
animate our work as law teachers throughout the curriculum.
In this Article, I begin by describing the widespread perception that
professional standards among lawyers are declining. Accompanying
that perception is an emerging realization that the task of reversing
that decline lies primarily in the domain of workplaces, which exert
the primary influence on shaping actual professional behavior. In the
final portion of the Article, I suggest themes that we who teach in law
school might incorporate in our teaching to respond to the perceived
crisis in values, while simultaneously taking account of the reality that
law schools' influence on actual professional behavior is likely to be
superceded by our students' workplace experiences.
10. THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29-102 (describing variety of lawyers' work).
11. One of the fundamental values of the profession set forth in The MacCrate Report is
"Selecting and Maintaining Employment That Will Allow the Lawyer to Develop As a
Professional and To Pursue His or Her Professional Goals." THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note
3, at 219. Commentary to The MacCrate Report suggests that the lawyer find "employment that
is consistent with his or her professional goals and personal values." Id. at 221.
12. ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND
83 (1992) (stating that law school experience causes students to define initial views of law and
society as inferior to alternative views developed in school, and to attribute inferiority of old
views to their own immaturity); see RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS 44 (1989)
(describing process of "distancing the personal self from the newly emerging professional self'
as predominant feature of law school); Sandra Janoff, The Influence of Legal Education on Moral
Reasoning, 76 MINN. L. REV. 193, 204-05 (1991) (evaluating effect on students of clash between
personal morality and institutional values produced by law school environment).
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I. DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM
A. Abiding Concerns About Professionalism
For those of us who worry about professionalism, these are
dispiriting times. The academic and the popular presses proclaim a
crisis in the legal profession, the demise of professionalism, and the
loss of professional values."3 Many claim that lawyers, clients, and
market conditions have transformed the practice of law from an
honorable calling to an ordinary business.14 It has, they say, become
increasingly commercial15 and specialized, 6 resulting in legal
representation that is almost solely devoted to serving clients' short-
term interests.17 Lawyers today do their client's bidding uncon-
strained by any obligation to the public interest or to the system ofjustice.1'
13. ABA COMM'N ON ADVERTISING, LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS 7 (1995)
[hereinafter LAWYER ADVERTISING] (stating that "[t]he legal community has a strong and
increasing sense that over the past several years the image of the profession has declined
dramatically in the eyes of the public"); KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that "[t] his book
is about a crisis in the American legal profession. Its message is that the profession now stands
in danger of losing its soul"); SOL M. LINOWrz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21-46 (1994) (offering prescription for
restoring respect for legal profession); Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The Decline of
Professionalis; 63 FORDHAm L. REv. 949, 949 (1995) (characterizing decline of professionalism
in law as of "epidemic proportions"); Nelson & Trubek, New Problems, supra note 5, at 11
(discussing "demise of professionalism"); Paul L. Stevens, Good Client Relations Are Essential to
Restoring Public ConJzdence in Lawyers, PA. LAW.,July 1994, at 4 (concluding that level of criticism
of legal profession is greater now than at any previous time).
14. See Nelson & Trubek, New Problems, supra note 5, at 2 (relating history of criticism of
legal profession as too commercial).
15. See LAWYER ADVERTISING, supra note 13, at 7 (discussing commercialization as factor
often mentioned by lawyers as causing poor public image of legal profession); Nathan M. Crystal
& Gregory B. Adams, Introductory Remarks to the Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal
Profession, 45 S.C. L. REV. 883, 883 (1994) (suggesting that fears of commercialization of legal
profession are not new, but there are some new and worrisome aspects to problem including
that lawyers are now subject to pressures of market forces and face loss of professional
autonomy); Alex M.Johnson,Jr., Think Like a Laryer, Work Like a Machine: TheDissonance Between
Law School and Law Practice 64 S. CAL. L REV. 1231, 1232 (1991) (discussing how increased
commercialization of legal profession has lead to dissatisfaction among lawyers who were not
expecting it); see also Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150,157 (Cal. 1994) (upholding noncompete
clause in partnership agreement in recognition of increasingly commercial nature of profession).
16. See KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 275-76 (noting trend in large law firms toward
specialization partially due to increased size and sophistication of in-house law departments).
17. See KRoNMAN, supra note 7, at 286; Coquillette, supra note 5, at 1273.
18. In The Lost Lauyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, Professor Kronman describes the
lost professional ideal of a lawyer as someone who is more than a servant of others. KRONMAN,
supra note 7, at 14.
He cares about the public good and is prepared to sacrifice his own well-being for it
.... Whether acting as the representative of private interests or as a counselor in
matters of state, one important part of what he does is to offer advice about ends....
The lawyer-statesman is a paragon ofjudgment, and others look to him for leadership
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This crisis has many symptoms. Lawyers are increasingly dissatisfied
with practicing law because it makes extraordinary demands on them
without providing compensating satisfactions.' 9 Many no longer feel
the loyalty that traditionally led to an association with one law firm for
their entire careers.2 ° Many no longer expect that clients will look
to them for advice either on a long-term basis or with respect to a
broad range of issues.21 Lawyers and the public view legal represen-
tation as excessively preoccupied with short-term client goals and with
winning at any cost,22 as well as leading to a breakdown in ordinary
civility and decency.23 Responding to questions about declining
standards, one lawyer characterized the problem:
The law profession is now a competitive business with enormous
pressures on lawyers to meet large payrolls and carry a large
overhead. I have found a "kill or be killed" attitude between
lawyers who will probably never see an opposing counsel in another
case. Clients also seem to want lawyers who take the "Rambo"
on account of his extraordinary deliberative power.
Id. at 14-15.
19. See Nancy C. Dart, The First Fve Years of Practice, 21 CONN. L. REV. 81, 83-86 (1988)
(listingsources of dissatisfaction as including narrow specialization, fewerlong-term relationships
with clients, fewer meaningful contacts with other firm lawyers, and escalating number of billable
hours required);Johnson, supra note 15, at 1249-51 (stating that dissatisfaction occurs because
expected glamorousjobs are actually trivial and boring and high salaries do not compensate for
difficult and demanding aspects ofjob); Manual R. Ramos, LegalMalpractice TheProfession'sDirty
Little Secret 47 VAND. L. REv. 1657, 1715 (1994) (citing 1991 ABAYoung Lawyer's Division study
that documented complaints about daily stress, time and work pressures, and competition,
among other things).
20. See KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 277-78 (attributing lack of loyalty to increased size of
firms that make it difficult to relate to firm in personal way).
21. KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 276. One reason for the decline in loyalty between clients
and their lawyers is growth in the size and expertise of corporate in-house legal departments.
1d.; Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational
Representation, 64 IND. LJ. 479, 489 (1989).
22. Robert C. Cumbow, A Learned Profession, 81 A.BA.J. 104, 104 (1995) (stating that "law
today is merely a process for achieving desired ends. The successful litigant does not win
because he is right: He is right because he wins").
23. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Ciility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513,513
(1994) (documenting "widespread dissatisfaction... amongjudges and lawyers with the gradual
changing of the practice of law from an occupation characterized by congenial professional
relationships to one of abrasive confrontations").
In Florida Bar v. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995), the Court upheld a Florida Bar
regulation imposing a 30-day prohibition against sending targeted direct-mall to accident victims
and their families on grounds that such regulation served a substantial state interest in
protecting against further erosion of the flagging professional reputations of Florida's lawyers.
Id. at 2376-77.
"Lawyerjokes" exploiting this theme abound, e.g., Question: Why are scientists substituting
lawyers for rats in mazes? Answer:. They were becoming too attached to the rats. Another
lawyer joke is the definition printed on a $5.00 mug, "Attorney-one who pleads, objects,
challenges, argues, swears, and is paid for it."
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approach and lawyers give in to this pressure.
24
Whether the crisis in professionalism is new or an intensified version
of historical discontent,2 the concerns seem to be deeper and more
widespread than in the past.
26
It is ironic that this outcry about declining values comes at the same
time that law schools have been paying increased attention to
teaching professionalism and ethics. The increase in law review
articles and other research about values education is one such
indication.27 Another indicator is a 1991-92 American Bar Founda-
tion (ABF) survey.28 In that survey, lawyers ranked their perceptions
of the relative contributions of law school and practice to the develop-
ment of skills and values. 9  The results showed that young lawyers,
whether practicing in a big city or a rural setting, ranked law school,
along with advice from other lawyers, as their most important sources
for learning "sensitivity to professional ethical concerns."' ° The vast
majority of hiring partners, the study showed, expected that newly
hired lawyers would bring such sensitivity from law school rather than
24. Aspen, supra note 23, at 517 (quoting Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the
Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 392 (1991)).
25. Professor Rayman Solomon describes the period from 1925 to 1960 as "marked by
nearly continuous crisis for the legal profession." SeeRayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The
Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWES' IDEALS, supra note 5, at 144, 145. Themes
that bar leaders used during that period to characterize the crisis included concerns about an
increasingly commercialized profession and the absence of lawyers' independence, particularly
from wealthy clients. I& at 152-53, 168-69.
26. See Nelson & Trubek, New Problems, supra note 5, at 1-2 (stating that "until the recent
campaign [by the organized bar to revive professionalism] it has been unusual for leaders to see
commercialism as something affecting the profession as a whole, or for such analyses to prompt
such a general response").
27. See, e.g., RHODE & LUB'N, supra note 5, at 2 (describing "[o]ne of the most striking
changes in the legal world over the past two decades has been the increasing attention to
professional responsibility and regulation"). Rhode and Luban state that"[s]ince the 1970s, the
law of lawyering has developed at an explosive rate; empirical research has expanded at a
corresponding speed; and the philosophical underpinnings of professional roles have attracted
more searching examination." Id.; see also, e.g., Paul Brest, Plus Ca Change, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1945, 1952 (1993) (stating that "[diuring the past several decades, legal ethics has been
transformed from an academic backwater to the subject of much excellent scholarship, showing
it to be a field every bit as intellectually challenging as most others in the curriculum"). See
generally Symposium, Teaching Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 1 (1991) (discussing ethical
responsibilities of lawyers and legal ethics education); RobertA. Gorman, Introduction, Curriculum
Developments: A Symposium, 39J. LEGAL EDuC. 469 (1989) (examining various approaches to law
school curriculum design and reform).
28. See Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 471-72. But see Wallace
Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report-Heuristic or Prescriptive?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 505, 508-10
(1994) (describing survey of University of Washington Law School alumni that suggests law
schools devote insufficient attention to teaching professional ethics and social responsibility).
29. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 478-88.
30. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 488-86.
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develop it on the job."' In fact, "sensitivity to professional ethical
concerns" was one of two areas of knowledge (of a total of seventeen
areas surveyed) for which partners ranked new associates as better or
somewhat better than their predecessors . 2 The authors of the 1991-
92 ABF survey concluded:
There has been a dramatic increase in the role of law schools in the
teaching of legal ethics.... Our figures demonstrate that profes-
sional responsibility is now very much in the mainstream of a legal
education. [Law] partners report that it is supposed to be brought
to the law firms; recent graduates tell us that it is taught in the
main law school curriculum and is learned essentially through law
school.33
Inasmuch as increased attention to teaching professional responsi-
bility in law schools apparently has not alleviated concerns about
declining professionalism,' perhaps we need to shift our focus.3 5
While there is surely a role for education in influencing moral or
ethical behavior, that role should be properly understood. Even the
finest moral education-one that teaches the rules of the profession,
31. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 490. Those findings provide
an interesting contrast with the 1981 study on which it was modeled. SeeFRANCES KAHN ZEMANS
& VICrOR G. ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 172-76 (1981) (finding that
lawyers perceived their personal upbringing along with observation and advice from other
lawyers in practice as more significant than law school instruction in forming ethical behavior).
32. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 503.
33. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 493; see alsoJoanne Martin
& Bryant G. Garth, Clinical Education as a Bridge Between Law School and Practice: Mitigating the
Misery, I CLINICAL L. REv. 443, 447 (1994) [hereinafter Martin & Garth, Clinical Education]
(finding law school to be generally successful in teaching sensitivity to professional ethical
concerns).
34. There is no shortage of attention to the perceived problems in the methods by which
professional responsibility is taught in law school. A 1979 study by Ronald Pipkin found that law
school professional responsibility classes were ranked by students as "requiring less time, as being
substantially easier, as less well taught, and as less valuable" than other courses. Pipkin, supra
note 2, at 258. He characterized such teaching as often encompassing war stories, and moral
preachments. Id. at 259-65. Although there may well be some improvement since then,
professional responsibility teaching is still criticized. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 27, at 1950-52
(suggesting that professional responsibility be more strongly stressed in law school); Theresa
Glennon, Lawyer and Caring. Building an Ethic of Care into Professional Responsibility, 43 HASTINGS
LJ. 1175, 1176-77 (1992) (criticizing individualistic and competitive approach to legal
education); Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 40-42 (discussing limitations in
professional responsibility instruction); Simon, Trouble with Legal Ethics, supra note 2, at 65-66
(finding that law students considered classes in legal ethics boring and insubstantial). I do not
mean to overlook those criticisms in this Article. Undoubtedly, those of us with direct
responsibility for teaching professional responsibility can do better. My focus here, however, is
to highlight the important effect that workplace experiences will have on professional behavior,
no matter how skillful our educational efforts, and to suggest some things we might do in law
school to address that reality.
35. See Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 32 (stating that "[b]y casting
professional responsibility instruction as an all-purpose antidote for professional lapses, advocates
have misconceived its role").
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attempts to cultivate the capacity for reflective moral judgment, and
actively engages students in values clarification and moral
choice86-- is likely to be undermined if the workplaces in which our
students practice systematically undercut expressions of personal
values or constrain the exercise ofjudgment 7
B. The Workplace Is the Primary Influence on Professional Behavior
If we law teachers hope to have an impact on the manner in which
our students practice, our teaching should be informed by an
appreciation for the importance of workplace experiences in
influencing professional behavior.
A recent study, designed to assess the effect of student work
experiences on the formation of professional values, showed that,
notwithstanding the documented expectation that sensitivity to ethical
concerns would be learned in law school," workplace experiences
more strongly influence professional behavior, particularly those
experiences that occur early in one's career.s9
This study demonstrated that a student's practice environment
quickly supersedes law school as a source of reference for demarcat-
ing professionally acceptable behavior.... [T] here appears to be
some real limits to what the law schools can be expected to
accomplish in terms of inculcating professional responsibility values
that will actually affect the behavior of students when they get into
practice.?
This study is consistent with other empirical data about the factors
that exert the strongest influences on moral conduct. Situational
conditions such as stress, time constraints, competition, economic
need, workplace pressures, and peer influences substantially influence
moral behavior.4'
36. lanJohnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing. An Overview of Teaching
Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 75-81 (1991).
37. See Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 46 (stating that empirical evidence on
lawyers' ethics suggests that situational pressures play important role in shaping commitment
and conduct). Studies show that "unethical behavior depends heavily on exposures to
temptation, workplace pressures, and collegial attitudes." Id.
38. See Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 482-91 (conducting
American Bar Foundation survey of lawyers' and hiring partners' perceptions of ethical
training); see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
39. Hellman, supra note 3, at 611.
40. Hellman, supra note 3, at 616.
41. See Rhode, The Pervasive Method, supra note 4, at 44-48 (citing studies which found that
even if moral education had some effect on moral values, moral conduct is substantially affected
by self-interest and situational pressures such as stress, competition, authority, peer influence
and time); D. L. Rosenhan, Moral Character, 27 STAN. L. REV. 925, 929-33 (1975) (examining
justification and situational conditions as determinants of moral behavior).
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The American Bar Association (ABA) has acknowledged the
importance of workplace experiences in shaping professional
behavior,42 but has nevertheless continued to emphasize law school
education as the primary remedy for problems regarding professional
values.43  Recently, The MacCrate Report, which focused explicitly on
the perceived gap between law school education and professional
practice, referred to the possibility that workplace experiences and
culture might overwhelm education in the area of values, particularly
if such experiences departed substantially from what was learned in
law school. "[A] young lawyer's ethical standards are likely to be
shaped far more by his or her mentors in the early years of practice
than by the experiences one acquires in the limited practice setting
available in law school."4  Nevertheless, The MacCrate Report still
primarily emphasized the law school's important role in teaching skills
and values, which were treated together throughout the report."
42. In the 1980s, ABA studies about the legal profession acknowledged the possibility that
workplace experiences could decisively shape professional behavior. See LAW SCHOOLS AND
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITrEE FOR A
STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 62 (1980) [hereinafter FoULlS
REPORT); STANLEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
Of course, the sensitizing of law students about ethical issues is not only the
responsibility of law schools. Often, law students' first exposure to the world of
practicing lawyers comes when they clerk for law firms at the end of their first year in
law school and thereafter. Ifwhat they see in these firms is inconsistent with the ideals
taught in law school, the best academic effort may be for naught.
STANLEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
43. Hellman, supra note 3, at 537-38 ("Much of the profession's self-analysis has focused on
legal education, which is viewed as either a major cause of any perceived problems in the
profession or the logical place to turn for solutions-or both."); Robert L. Nelson & David M.
Trubek, Arenas of Professionalim: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context [hereinafter
Nelson & Trubeck, Arenas of Professionalism], in LAWYERS' IDEALS, supra note 5, at 177, 192
(describing that "emphasis on education [in the Stanley Report] creates the impression that the
decline in professionalism comes from a lack of understanding of what the obligations of a
lawyer are, rather than from any conflict between idealized notions of desirable conduct and
everyday work pressures").
44. THE MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 235. It is particularly telling that The MacCrate
Report concedes the law school's limited role in instilling ethical standards because the report
otherwise focuses heavily on the importance of law school education in the teaching of skills.
Id. at 233-68.
45. Indeed at one point, The MacCrate Report refers to "recognizing and resolving ethical
dilemmas" as a skil, rather than a value. THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 235. Treating
the teaching of skills and values together exemplifies one point in this Article, that values
education is essentially experiential and must be embedded in context to be meaningful. On
the other hand, blurring the distinction between skills and values education implies that
teaching values involves teaching techniques, rather than habits of thought andjudgment. See
Timothy L. Hall, Moral Character, The Practice of Law and LegalEducation, 60 MISS. LJ. 511, 514-17
(1990) (arguing that character of law students is important element in ethical decisionmaking
that cannot be replaced). The Mac~rate Report addressed this concern: "The Statement of Skills
and Values emphasizes the essential linkage between lawyering skills and professional values.
It is hoped that this holistic approach to lawyering will in the future help avoid the perpetuation
of the notion that competence is simply a matter of attaining proficiency in specified skills."
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The probable reason for a continuing emphasis on law school as
the primary forum for values training is that it is the only focused
educational experience that affects all lawyers.46 The diversity and
autonomy of the profession make it unlikely that there will be another
systematic opportunity to address those issues in practice.47 As a
matter of default, law schools will undoubtedly continue to be the
focus for institutional reform efforts in the area of values, despite
increasing appreciation of the importance of workplace experiences
in shaping professional behavior. Our teaching should self-conscious-
ly address that reality.
C. Discretion and Experience Combine to Make Workplace Experiences
More Vivid and Lasting than Passive Instruction
One reason workplace experiences importantly affect behavior is
that within the framework of professional rules and mores, lawyers
have substantial discretion in determining how to act. 8 There are
those who argue that embedded in the professional rules is a standard
conception of professional identity that channels and limits the role
THE MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 317. In my view, the focus of The MacCrate Report on
a relatively mechanical enumeration of skills and values undermined its avowed purpose of
creating an integrated approach. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the
Field:Wat's Missing from the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69
WASH. L. REv. 593,594,607-15 (1994) (finding that The MacCrate Report embodied "taxo-nomic,
scientistic, classificatory, and schematic thinking about awyering" and enshrined limited
conceptualization of skills).
46. See Michael Norwood, Scenes from the Continuum: Sustaining the MacCrate Report's Vision
of Law School Education into the Twenty-First Century, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 297 (1995)
(acknowledging law school as lawyers' most intensely focused educational experience).
47. SeeTHE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 111-14 (documenting history of law school
unifying experience); STANLEY REPORT, supra note 3, at 16 (emphasizing that "[w)e begin our
recommendations with law schools, not because they represent the profession's greatest
problems but because they constitute our greatest opportunities").
There are Continuing Legal Education (CLE) providers that offer CLE to practicing lawyers
in ethics and professionalism. According to The MacCrate Report, those courses are in heavy
demand only injurisdictions with mandatory CLE requirements. THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 313. Many lawyers in mandatory CLE jurisdictions do not approach those courses
enthusiastically. See, e.g., William S. Stevens, Ethics and CLE, PHILA. LAW., Winter 1993, at 25
(summarizing lawyers' responses to survey on Pennsylvania's new CLE requirements in ethics
as, "Lawyers don't like it."). One lawyer stated his objection as follows: "As for ethics, requiring
a knave to listen to five hours of lectures on ethics per year will give you a bored knave, not an
honest attorney." Id.
48. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52 (1988) (noting lawyer's
discretion within ethics rules); Hall, supra note 45, at 532-34 (stating Model Code of Professional
Responsibility creates zone in which lawyers are free to employ their own moral perspectives and
dispositions); Johnstone & Treuthart, supra note 36, at 78 (finding that legal procedures and
codes of conduct leave room for considerable ethical discretion); William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (1988) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical
Discretion] (believing that under libertarian approach to ethical decisionmaking, legal ethics
impose on lawyers only duty of loyalty to client).
834 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:823
of discretion. 9 Under this conception, the rules enshrine partisan-
ship (single-minded, uncritical devotion to the client's cause); °
neutrality (indifference to clients' ends);5' and role-differentiated
behavior (conduct that one may be reluctant to engage in on one's
own behalf, but which is justified because it is performed on behalf
of the client).52 Even those who argue most strenuously that the
standard conception is accurate, 3 suggest that it is possible to
construct, within the rules, an alternative model that includes
deliberation with clients about the appropriateness or wisdom of the
client's goals54 and the introduction of moral concerns into client
counseling.5 The culture of the practice situations in which lawyers
work and the nature of their work are important influences on the
manner in which they exercise that discretion. 6
49. See LUBAN, supra note 48, at 104-74 (criticizing standard conception of lawyer's role).
50. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239, 1249-52 (1991)
(noting that Model Rules of Professional Conduct continue tradition of envisioning lawyers as
partisan advocates of client's claims).
51. Kenneth L. Penegar, The FIrve Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. PrT. L. REV. 307, 372
(1988) (stating that Model Code of Professional Responsibility is "passive or neutral" toward
client's morally objectionable ends).
52. See LUBAN, supra note 48, at xix-xxi (outlining standard conception of lawyers' role).
Some critics argue that there is no standard conception of a lawyer's role or that the conception
fails to conform empirically to reality. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophys Standard
Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1529, 1532-37 (arguing that role-differentiated
behavior is attributable to psychological and economic pressures of law practice or to moral
values shared by lawyers and nonlawyers alike, rather than to distinctive professional ethic); Ted
Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 12-27 (1991) (responding to
critics of "hired gun" ethic and defending his definition of that ethic).
53. See LUBAN, supra note 48, at xx ("These three elements [of the standard conception]
form a highly coherent picture that resonates with so much of our familiar experience and
contains so many points of plain truth that it is hard to argue with.").
54. See LUBAN, supra note 48, at 394-95 (highlighting ethics rules that stress lawyers' ability
to counsel clients on moral issues); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 81-83 (1980) (suggesting new code of professional responsibility that
requires lawyers to consider social and moral costs of their actions).
55. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 48, at 169-74 (noting that "nothing permits a lawyer to
discard her discretion or relieves her of the necessity of asking whether a client's project is
worthy of a decent person's service"); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN,JR., LAWYERS,
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (1994) (finding moral considerations in all legal
representation); Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 507, 553-60, 578-83 (1994) (criticizing moral independence theory of
lawyer-client relationship and suggesting instead interdependence theory). Seegeneral Simon,
Ethical Discretion, supra note 48, at 1083 (suggesting that lawyers have discretion to decide which
clients to represent and how to represent them and that these judgments by lawyers ought to
further justice).
56. MICHAEL KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACrICE 13
(1994) (discussing how rationalizations and compromises developed in actual practice settings
transform standard concepts of professionalism within the legal community); KRONMAN, supra
note 7, at 298 (stating that "changes in the practice of a firm may sometimes limit the extent
to which its lawyers are called upon to give deliberative advice, and in the culture of today's
large firm, with its heavy emphasis on money, such limitations will not be given significant
weight").
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Experience exerts a powerful influence over the exercise of
discretion. Experiential learning is critically important to moral
development.57 Aristotle stated that one had to practice virtuous
behavior, modeling oneself on the good, and then reflect on it for
such behavior to become a part of one's character.58 As Justice
Holmes said: "We learn how to behave as lawyers, soldiers, mer-
As I argue throughout this Article, we law teachers convey, explicitly or implicitly, a relatively
impoverished view of the variety and complexity of practice. In particular, we do not do a very
goodjob introducing students to the idea or extent of their discretion in practice. Either they
believe that there is little room for the exercise of discretion, or they believe that their discretion
will be constrained by their clients or supervisors.
In the absence of attempts to confront practical constraints, many students tacitly
assume that they will have virtually no autonomy in practice, that the parmers must do
as clients say, and that they as associates must do as their partners say, without any slack
for cavil or maneuver, at peril of losing theirjobs. In other words, students assume
that practical considerations will almost always trump ethical ones in the 'real world,'
that the constraints of practice will leave the lawyer so little discretion that ambitious
reflection would be pointless.
Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Profesionalism, in LAWYERS' IDEALS,
supra note 5, at 238.
Elsewhere, Professor William Simon suggests that the focus on examining and teaching the
formal disciplinary codes undercuts "complex, creative judgment and... subvert[s] the vital
aspirations of professionalism." Simon, Trouble with Legal Ethics, supra note 2, at 67.
The transactional approach to teaching is an effective teaching method to assist students to
develop an appreciation for the role of discretion in practice. See infra notes 65-66 and
accompanying text; see also Hellman, supra note 3, at 539-41 (commenting that lawyers' work
atmosphere plays significant role in determining professional behavior).
57. SeeRichardW. Miller, Ways ofMoralLearning, 94 PHILosoPHIcAL REv. 507,529-30 (1985)
(describing contemporary moral theorists who see moral learning occuring through "empathic
role-taking on the basis of equality"); Paul T. Wangerin, Objective, Multiplistic, and Relative Truth
in Developmental Psychology and Legal Education, 62 TUL L REV. 1237, 1282-83 n.171 (1988)
(describing developmental theories of William Perry, Lawrence Kolhberg, and Norma Hoan, all
standing for proposition that "actual experience best promotes movement toward the highest
levels of [moral] development"); see also Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through
Experiential Teaching, 1 CutINcAL L. Rav. 505,522-27 (1995) (containing results of empirical study
confirming connection between moral thought and experiential classroom teaching); June
Louin Trapp & Felice J. Levine, Legal Socialization: Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 31-36 (1974) (discussing values education as requiring active participation in resolving
conflicts concerning one's personal values, role-taking opportunities, and exposure to diverse
legal cultures).
58. See Robert Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER 317,
323 (David Luban ed., 1984) (discussing how Aristotle's foundational philosophical claim holds
that one must act in certain way before understanding principle embodied by that way of
acting). "Principles are arrived at by reflection upon activities that have been experienced
prereflexively and internalized as dispositions. A person learns virtues by imitating good people
and good actions." Id; see also M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Learning to Be Goo4, in ESSAYS ON
ARISTOTLE'S ETHics 69, 73 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980) (explaining that "Aristotle is not
simply giving us a bland reminder that virtue takes practice. Rather, practice has cognitive
powers, in that it is the way we learn what is noble orjust."); Steven L. Pepper, Counseling at the
Limits of the Law: An Exercise in theJuisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE LJ. 1545,1606-
07 (1995) (suggesting that, under neo-Aristotelian understanding of ethics, lawyers' characters
largely determines their choices, moral perception, and decisionmaking).
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chants, or what not by being them. Life, not the parson, teaches
conduct."59
Proponents of clinical legal education have long understood the
importance of concrete experience to moral learning.
60
"[E]xperience produces a qualitative change in the mode and
content of knowing, which cannot be replicated by the transmission
of information or the discussion of cases .... The way in which
ideas are understood after they have been used feels different in a
sense that is not fully explained by the fact that they are more easily
remembered." This is particularly true of ideas about values, much
of whose content is lost when understood in a purely intellectual
way.
61
In other words, it is not until students actually experience the
reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make their own
moral and ethical judgments that are at the core of practice. Because
the opportunities in law school for experiential learning are relatively
limited,62 the first extended and systematic exposure to practicing
law usually does not occur until after graduation.
The cultures of the workplaces in which our students first find
themselves may well influence their ethical and moral behavior far
more than does our teaching in law school. Much data suggests that
workplace influences may undercut our students' desires to practice
in conformity with their own visions of professionalism. 6' How can
59. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Fredrick Pollock (Apr. 2, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERs: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. juscE HOLMEs AND SIR FREDRICK POLLOCK,
1874-1932, at 178 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941).
60. SeeMark NealAaronson, Dark Night of the Souk A Review of Anthony T. Kronman's The Lost
Lawyer Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1379, 1397 (1994) (stating that
clinical courses are richest source "for nurturing judgment and testing character"); Hartwell,
supra note 57, at 506 n.4 (listing clinicians who have written about their success promoting
moral development in clinical setting); lanJohnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right
Thing: An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 92-95 (1991)
(suggesting that although professional responsibility may not necessarily be "better taught" in
clinical setting, it may be "better learned" there).
61. Condlin, supra note 58, at 321 (quoting from Gary Bellow, On Teaching the Teachers:
Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE
LAW STUDENT 374, 391 (Council on Legal Educ. for Prof. Responsibility ed., 1973)).
62. SeeTHE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 245,259-60; see also Martin & Garth, Clinical
Education, supra note 33, at 453 (arguing that only small number of new lawyers identify clinical
courses as important educational tool because clinical training is not widely available to law
students). Of course, clinical education is not the only opportunity for experiential learning in
law school. See Hartwell, supra note 57, at 531-35 (advocating use of experiential student-
centered ethics classes in law schools); Steven Lubet, Ethics and Theory Choice in Advocacy
Education, 44J. LEGAL EDUC. 81, 87-88 (1994) (arguing that trial advocacy courses are well suited
to introduction of ethics questions; and that raising them this way requires students to resolve
them in concrete and realistic setting and to live with their choices).
63. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Schools Must Teach Legal Ethics, 14 NAT'L gJ. 17, 17
(1991) (suggesting that despite law school ethics courses, many young lawyers learn by example
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we be realistic about current professional practice while simultaneous-
ly assisting our students to aspire to an improved profession?'
I suggest that the organized bar's emphasis on promoting the idea
of a unitary professional experience undermines the effort to instill
a spirit of aspiration in our students. Such a notion conveys an
implicit message that there is a standard or objective conception of
what constitutes a good lawyer. It reinforces our students' tendencies
to see ethics as a code of obedience rather than a system requiring
discretion and judgment, and, as a result, it undermines personal
responsibility. Rather, my goal is to convey to our students that the
legal profession is diverse, not unitary. This diversity derives primarily
from the nature of professional work, from the variety of people who
make up the practice, and from the importance of context to the
resolution of professional questions. Being a good lawyer does not
mean behaving in a single way, in particular it does not require
conformity to a conception of lawyering that denies the validity of our
students' preexisting moral intuitions and sense. Students should not
think that they have to suppress their best instincts to be good
lawyers.65 Within our diverse profession, we should encourage our
students to seek a practice that utilizes their strengths and suits their
personalities. In that search they should be guided by the notion that
questions of professional behavior are profound and difficult. They
should not be reticent about raising them even if they think that such
questions are common or recurrent, and they should not be afraid to
call on mentors in practice to assist in resolving them. I believe that
these themes ought to inform our teaching throughout the curricu-
to ignore ethical obligations); see also Dart, supra note 19, at 83 (discussing change in attitude
during early years of practice); Ramos, supra note 19, at 1700 (doubting whether professional
responsibility classes can alter law students' later behavior in practice).
64. See MargaretJane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminis 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1699-
1704 (1990) (discussing problem of "double bind" which arises when one tries to achieve justice
in nonideal world, which may paradoxically lead to perpetuating conditions of injustice).
65. Students struggle with the conflicts between devotion to client interests and preventing
harm to third persons, such as the dilemma presented by Spaulding v. Zimmerman, a settlement
negotiation in which the lawyer for a settling defendant in an automobile accident failed to
disclose to plaintiff's counsel that plaintiff was suffering from a potentially fatal aneurysm that
might have been due to the accident. 116 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1962). An important point
to make in the discussion of this dilemma is that the rules do not require that the defense lawyer
behave in that manner. The lawyer can seek consent from the client to disclose, can argue
persuasively that the long-term interests of the client are best served by disclosure, and can
withdraw if the client refuses to disclose. We law teachers can also point out to our students that
many practicing lawyers simply would not cooperate with a client in keeping the information
from the potentially injured party. One highly regarded personal injury attorney to whom I
posed a similar hypothetical stated that he would just call up his client and say that he had to
tell the plaintiff or he might die. There was no question that, for him, no client was worth
sacrificing his fundamental decency.
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II. ADDRESSING THE REALITY
A. We Are Not a Unitary Profession
As I began to write this Article, a student came to see me after
working for two weeks at her part-time summerjob. She was writing
complaints and answering interrogatories at a law firm from which an
associate had recently left. There was a lot of nastiness surrounding
the associate's departure (such as refusing to tell phone callers where
he could be reached), which was counterproductive in her view, and
the work that she was doing was boring and repetitive. She told me
that she was not cut out to be a lawyer and that she was considering
going into teaching.67 She assumed, as do many students, that what
she was experiencing was "the" practice of law, rather than one aspect
of a diverse, multifaceted profession.' She did not imagine that
there were other practice settings that would feel different, where
lawyers would behave more collegially, where the nature of the work
would be different, and where lawyers might utilize different talents.69
66. I recognize that there might be an inconsistency between my position that experiential
learning in the arena of values education is likely to overwhelm classroom experiences, and my
recommendations that follow for incorporating messages in teaching, implying that such
incorporation occurs through explication rather than experience. Seesupra text accompanying
notes 31 and 34. In fact, I believe that the ideal way to impart the messages discussed in this
Article is through a program of experiential learning, such as the one we have developed at
Temple Law School---"IntegratedTransactional Practice." Seeinfra note 163 (advocating benefits
of integrated course that centers on simulated clients' matters while simultaneously raising
professional responsibility questions). For example, if students are exposed via live clients or
simulations to lawyering tasks that utilize non-adversarial skills, and if they have the opportunity
to take account of third-party interests in counseling clients, they will understand the diversity
of the profession in a more profound way than by simply being exposed to a lecture on those
topics. In this Article, I primarily suggest themes that we can all use, irrespective of the
particular methods by which we choose to teach. In addition, I hope that the messages here
might also inform conversations with students outside of class.
67. I will not address the notion that discouraged and disaffected practitioners comprise
the ranks of academic faculty, although I believe that the presence of faculty who disdain
practice should be taken into account in any full discussion of teaching about the profession.
See generallyJ. Cunyon Gordon, A Responsefrom the Visitorfrom Another Planet, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1953, 1958-60 (1993) (discussing anti-practice bias among law professors); Carrie J. Menkel-
Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J. LEGAL EDUc. 3, 7 (1991)
(suggesting that most law professors communicate disdain for "real world activity and practice").
68. See Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism, supra note 43, at 177-79 (discussing
misconception that only one official professional ideology exists within legal community).
69. Survey results about declining civility in the legal profession document that the problem
is "significantly greater and more common in large urban areas where the practice of law has
become depersonalized" and where lawyers less commonly encounter one another on a repeated
basis. Aspen, supra note 23, at 523.
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It is easy to see how she received this message. Both the culture of
law school v" and the bar's professional rhetoric promote the idea
that the profession is unitary,71 with a single or dominant conception
of what it means to be a good lawyer.72 Law schools teach that legal
problems can be solved through intellectual and abstract reason-
ing;7 3 personal concerns and individual moral preferences are
beyond the law's competence; 4 reason is privileged over emotion in
solving legal problems,75 and legal representation ought to be
characterized by an attitude of impartiality and neutrality toward
client ends. 6 Professional rhetoric likewise supports the conception
of a unitary profession.77 The centerpiece of The MacCrate Report was
a Statement of Fundamental Skills and Values, which represented the
ABA Task Force's attempt to initiate a process for developing a shared
conception of skills and values that were central to the role and
functioning of lawyers.7' The Task Force viewed its undertaking as
70. See Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The World of Law and Layering as
Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curricudum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1159
(1990) (suggesting that students' perceptions of law school are formed primarily by their first-
year experiences and that those experiences are roughly uniform).
71. See THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
72. JACK &JACK, supra note 12, at 163 (stating that currently lawyers in different practice
areas are "all taught the same rules of client relations and are all trained to play the same
professional role").
73. See Roger Cramton, The Ordinay Religion of the Classroom, 29J. LEGAL EDUc. 247, 262-63
(1978) (stating that law school professors encourage non-emotional, purely intellectual responses
in classroom); Lesnick, supra note 70, at 1162 (commenting that law school gives impression that
lawyers all do same job by "bringing our intellectual powers to bear on reasoning a problem
through to solution").
74. See Kleinberger, supra note 7, at 381 n.74 (asserting that law schools teach lawyers "to
be skeptical of everything except the conventional amorality of the legal profession"); Lesnick,
supra note 70, at 1180 (stating that legal reasoning is generally taught as realm of thought
insulated from other realms of learning and experience).
75. See Angela P. Harris & Maijorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure Reason": Toward
Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1993) (stating that dominant law
school teaching ideology treats development of logical thinking as central focus of legal training
and seeks to suppress emotional expression in classrooms); Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and
Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1575 (1987) (noting that "[It]he normal discourse of law
disallows the language of emotion and experience").
76. See GRANFIELD, supra note 12, at 89-92 (observing that law school encourages students
to become pragmatic and to discard their orientation toward social justice); Lesnick, supra note
70, at 1178-79 (arguing that law schools focus students on arguing instrumentally to achieve
client ends without encouraging reflection on nature and quality of those ends). See generally
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 67, at 7 (finding that traditional classrooms foster adversariness,
argumentativeness, zealotry, single-minded devotion to client ends, and disregard for non-client
concerns).
77. Nelson & Trubek, New Problems supra note 5, at 13 ("The bar ... has continued to
portray itself as a unitary profession in the service of a unitary legal system."); see also Loh, supra
note 28, at 511 (finding that "notion of a unitary legal profession" is rationale for professional
self-regulation and privileges that it entails).
78. THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 124-26.
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consistent with the traditional vision of law as a unitary profession.79
"The legal profession has... successfully preserved, to this time, the
vision of a single profession with a common notion of what it means
to be a lawyer."80
In fact, the profession is not unitary in any meaningful sense.81
Lawyers do different kinds of work, ranging from high stakes business
litigation to counseling individuals. Lawyers work in different
organizational settings, ranging from private law firms of varying sizes
to in-house legal departments to government and public interest
practices. Lawyers work in different geographic settings, ranging from
urban to rural.82 Lawyers represent different kinds of clients,
ranging from wealthy corporations to poor individuals. Authors of a
1982 study of the Chicago Bar, documenting these differences,
characterized the notion of a single unified profession as one that "no
longer fit[s] the facts."s3
79. THE MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 124.
80. THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
81. See KELLY, supra note 56, at 1 (noting that legal profession is increasingly more
specialized and heterogeneous); Donald P.Judges, Voyages on the H.M.S. Beage, 49 SMU L. REV.
611, 623 (1995) ("It may seem self-evident that no single concept can define what it means to
be a member of a professional group that is the size of, say, Baltimore or Indianapolis."); Loh,
supra note 28, at 511 (asserting that legal profession is stratified and specialized in its functions,
and that "not all lawyers are cut from the same mold"); Jonathan Rose, The MacCrate Report's
Restatement ofLegalEducation: The Needfor Reflection and Horse Sense, 44J. LEGAL EDUC. 548, 558
(1994) (noting that it is unclear whether "unitary concept" exists today, given varied practices
and highly differentiated work).
82. SeeKRONMAN, supranote 7, at 378-79 (discussing differences between smaller rural firms
and their larger urban counterparts). Professor Anthony Kronman in his book The Lost Lawyer,
championed the ideal of the lawyer statesman, whose work he characterized by the traits of
practical wisdom and devotion to the public interest Id. at 12. He was pessimistic that lawyers
could find such work in large law firms in urban centers. Id. at 378-79. He suggested, however,
that practice in rural areas might offer an opportunity to fulfill his conception of the
professional ideal. Id.
These firms typically serve a local market that is to varying degrees detached from
the larger ones in which the biggest firms and their spin-offs operate. They commonly
exhibit a lower degree of specialization. They are less influenced by the culture of
growth that now dominates most large law firms in the country's major cities. And they
are often intertwined in complex ways with the communities in which they exist.
Id at 379; see also Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 3, at 476 (suggesting that
there are differences in perception of importance of certain skills and competencies between
urban and rural practitioners and between large and small firms). For example, small firm and
rural practitioners rated sensitivity to professional ethical concerns more highly than did their
large urban firm counterparts. I&
83. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDwARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWyERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR 3 (1982). This 1982 analysis of the Chicago Bar documented the growth of what it
termed two professions, one characterized by the representation of large entity clients with
economic concerns and the other concerned with individual clients with "personal plight"
claims. Id at 321. The type of client represented resulted in differing lawyering tasks, distinct
ethics of practice, and generally different socialization patterns for the lawyers associated with
that type of representation. Id at 319-32 (asserting that lawyers who serve large organizations
differ systematically from those who work for individuals and small businesses, regardless of
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We are told that the tumultuous process that led to the ABA's
adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct included
arguments from all sectors of the profession over the proper
definition of professional conduct.8 4 Controversy regarding issues
such as confidentiality and entity representation highlighted how
lawyers in different practices expressed their professional concerns in
different ways.
Taking trial lawyers, corporate counsel, legal services lawyers, code
enforcers, judges, private practitioners in large and small firms, law
professors, and others properly into account ... one is struck by
the heterogeneity of ethical views in today's profession.... Legal
services lawyers want rules that guarantee their zealous commitment
to clients and special attention to the problem of advancing
litigation expenses for the indigent and the problem of maintaining
professional independence from lay employers. Securities lawyers
want ethics rules that buffer them from an aggressive SEC. Small-
town lawyers do not want to formalize their ongoing client
relationships by putting fee agreements in writing. Bar counsel want
the easiest rules to enforce. Trial lawyers want to minimize the
perception that they might have to betray their clients' trust, even
at the risk of having to blink at perjury. And so on."
Professional diversity stems from at least three important sources:
the nature of the professional work itself, the diversity of the people
engaged in practice, and the contextualized nature of ethical
decisionmaking. This means that each ethical question is, in
important ways, distinct from every other one because of its unique
context. In this Article, I focus primarily on the diversity and variety
of professional work and the contexualized nature of ethical
decisionmaking. Of course, the legal profession is increasingly diverse
demographically. The MacCrate Report describes striking changes in
size, age, gender, and race in the makeup of the profession since
World War 11.86
social origins, prestige of law schools they attended, their career histories and mobility, their
social or political values, or their networks of friends and professional associates).
TheMacCrateReportstated: "The great variety in practice settings and the highly differentiated
work in which lawyers are engaged present today the greatest challenge to law schools and the
profession in maintaining the unitary concept of being a lawyer." THE MAcCRATE REPORT, supra
note 3, at 29.
84. See Theodore Schneyer, Profemsionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics
Code, in LAWvERs' IDEALs, supra note 5, at 95 (discussing background of ABA's production of
Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
85. Id. at 14041.
86. THE MACGRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-27. Missing from that description, however,
is an account of disabled or gay and lesbian lawyers. Beverly Babos, Conferring on the MacCrate
Report: A Clinical Gaze, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 361 (1994).
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Individual perspectives and personalities of the lawyers with whom
our students work will be very important to the kind of practice they
experience.8 7 In my judgment, students appreciate that the person-
alities of the people with whom they will work will be significant to
the degree of satisfaction they experience in their work. They do not
appreciate as readily that the nature of legal work they do, and the
context in which they make professional decisions, will also be
profoundly important. I have therefore chosen in this Article to focus
on the work aspect of diversity and the contextualized nature of
ethical decisionmaking, both of which receive insufficient attention in
our teaching.
8
The diversity of practice and the discretion afforded by the
professional mores to construct alternative conceptions of lawyering
to accommodate those differences have led scholars to a more
comprehensive theory of professionalism. They reject the notion of
a unitary vision and substitute the idea that different workplaces and
practice situations produce differing professional visions; that there
are multiple "arenas of professionalism." 9 "[L]awyers possess widely
varying conceptions of professional ideals that correspond to the
historical and practical circumstances of their work."9"
Indeed within those arenas, lawyers have constructed multiple, even
conflicting, ideas of what constitutes professional lawyering.f The
struggles over, and debates about those competing visions are
themselves as important as arenas in which notions of professionalism
are forged.92
Conflicting articulations of professional values of loyalty and
confidentiality in different practice settings provide good examples of
the various professional visions that result from the diversity of
professional work.
87. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 56, at 53-83 (describing specific law finn as cooperative,
egalitarian, friendly, and good to people because it is managed by senior partner to whom those
values matter and because it consciously hires lawyers who share its values).
88. Nelson & Trubek, New Problems, supra note 5, at 11-13 (discussing how lawyers have
diversified their practices in response to changing market demands causing erosion of distinctive
professional tradition).
89. Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalim, supra note 43, at 177.
90. Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism, supra note 43, at 211. "One could posit a
great many legal professions, perhaps dozens, and to some degree there are perceptible
distinctions among all of these types of lawyers." HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 83, at 5; see
KELLY, supra note 56, at 1-2 (describing growing diversification of legal profession).
91. SeeNelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalim, supra note 43, at 187 (articulating lack of
"unitary vision" among arenas of practice).
92. See Nelson & Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism supra note 43, at 187-88 (noting that in
each arena of professional behavior there are ongoing struggles to define appropriate
professional visions).
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The conflict of interest provisions of the Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct provide that, absent consent, a lawyer should not
represent a client whose interests are directly adverse to another
client, or in circumstances where the lawyer's representation may be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person.93 The comments to that Rule advise that a lawyer
should not seek consent "when a disinterested lawyer would conclude
that the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances."94
The conflict of interest rule is often invoked in a litigation or
adversarial context to preclude a lawyer from simultaneously
representing clients whose interests actually or potentially diverge.95
Lawyers who represent clients in non-adversarial settings, however,
face distinct issues in multiple client representation." For example,
lawyers who do estate planning for married couples face a situation
in which clients share many goals, but also may have potential
conflicts with one another regarding such matters as distributive
schemes or the disposition of separate assets. The ethical dilemmas
of estate lawyers were so distinct from those arising in the litigation
context that the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate, and Trust
Law (Section) wrote a separate set of recommendations and commen-
taries setting forth its "prescriptive guide" on those ethical ques-
tions.97 In those recommendations, the Section characterized the
ABA's Model Rules "as a code of conduct for lawyers, written
primarily to govern the conduct of advocates,"" describing the
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) (setting forth general rules
pertaining to conflict of interest).
94. Id. at Rule 1.7 cmt.
95. See Shearing v. Allergan, No. CV-S-93-866-DWH (LRL), 1994 WL 382450, at *2 (D. Nev.
Apr. 5, 1994) (granting defendant's motion to disqualify law firm); Pennegar, supra note 51, at
309-10, 326-36 (expressing Model Code's dominant concerns to be individualistic conception
of who client is and deep loyalty to that client's interests).
96. See Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Comments and
Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and Wif, 28 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR.J. 765, 767 (1994) (outlining responsibilities of estate planning lawyers with respect to intra-
familial representation). The comments to the Model Rules recognize differences in multiple-
client representation, but provide relatively little guidance in assessing them. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt (1983). The tentative drafts of The Restatement of Law
Governing Lauyers by the American Law Institute set forth different conflict of interest rules for
different practice settings including civil litigation, criminal litigation, non-litigated matters, and
organizational representation. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 209-212
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 1990).
97. Reports of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Section
of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, Editor's Introduction,
28 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 763, 763 (1994) [hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT].
98. Id. at 767.
1996] 843
THE AMERICAN UNWERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:823
limitations of the Rules as they apply to lawyers representing married
couples as follows:
From an ethical standpoint, the risk is that, in counseling the
couple as a unit for tax and planning purposes, neither individual
will receive the representation a single individual might receive
under the same circumstances. Yet family needs, tax incentives and
the very nature of marriage often make separate counseling
unnecessary, and indeed, inappropriate. Lawyers may look to the
Model Rules to guide them in the representation, but will find only
a set of rules that assumes the existence of well-defined conflicts
between well-defined clients.9
The Section's recommendations as to modes of representation under
the Model Rules, 10 guidelines for observing confidentiality, 1 ' and
standards for obtaining consent,"2 all departed from the litigator's
conception of a lawyer single-mindedly representing an individual
client.
The Real Property, Probate and Trust Section's report attempted
to harmonize the reality of a distinct kind of practice with the
adversarial ethic that the Section perceived to dominate the ABA
Model Rules. It is an uneasy alliance. 03  It highlights a distinct
notion of professionalism that animates that arena of practice.
104
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers provides another
example of a distinct ethic developed to meet the special attributes of
a particular field of practice. In its Preliminary Statement to Bounds
99. I& at 770-71.
100. See id. at 771-72 (explaining joint representation and separate representation are two
modes of representation of husband and wife consistent with Model Rules).
101. Id. at 783-87.
102. Id at 779.
103. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 211 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
Apr. 10, 1994) (suggesting that attorney obtain formal consent when simultaneously giving both
husband and wife estate planning advice and drafting wills) with RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 211 (Preliminary Draft No. 11, May 18, 1995) (including in later version
illustrations that appear to give estates lawyers representing husbands and wives more leeway in
representing family unit without necessity of obtaining formal consent); compareABA Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) (indicating that when
representing fiduciary, lawyer owes duty of confidentiality to fiduciary and cannot ordinarily
disclose information adverse to fiduciary to beneficiaries, even if such disclosures are necessary
to protect interests of beneficiaries) with Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional
Responsibility, Counseling the Fiduciay, 28 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 825, 848 (1994) (asserting
that fiduciary is special type of client who has special duties to beneficiaries, and lawyer should
not be required to withhold confidential information from beneficiaries).
104. See SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 98, at 766 (asserting that
representation of husband and wife has little in common with adversarial aspect of litigation law
and is yet more difficult in that conflicting interests maybe harder to identify). "[T]he marriage
of two people does not create a per se conflict between them." Id. at 767. It is hard to imagine
another situation in which such a disclaimer would be necessary except to draw a contrast with
an unrelentingly adversarial vision.
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of Advocacy, a guide to ethical conduct for family lawyers, the
Academy stated: "Existing codes do not provide adequate guidance
to the matrimonial lawyer... [T]heir emphasis on zealous represen-
tation of individual clients in criminal and some civil cases is not
always appropriate in family law matters .... Many [family law
practitioners] have encountered instances where the [Rules of
Professional Conduct] provided insufficient, or even undesirable,
guidance." 5 The Matrimonial Lawyers' guide set forth standards
of conduct that departed from the traditional conception of lawyering
responsibilities, particularly with respect to children. Those recom-
mendations included considering the welfare of the children in any
marital dispute,"' prohibiting the use of child custody demands for
financial leverage or vindictiveness,0 7 and requiring disclosure of a
substantial risk of child abuse, even if the information was otherwise
confidential under the ethics rules or the attorney-client privilege.
1 8
The special regard for children in the Matrimonial Lawyers' guide is
a departure from the traditional conception of a lawyer single-
mindedly pursuing client goals with minimal regard for the interests
of third parties. 9
It is important for law teachers to convey to students the diversity
of practice and the accompanying modes of professionalism."0 Our
students should begin to appreciate that different practices entail
different skills and cultures.' Not only do they differ by the nature
of the legal tasks performed (e.g., counseling husbands and wives for
the future as opposed to litigating over events in the past), but within
modes of practice there are different cultures as well. The much-
criticized "scorched earth" and "Rambo" litigation tactics characterize
105. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL lAWYERS, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT 3-4 (1991).
106. Id. at 27 (Rule 2.23).
107. Id. at 28 (Rule 2.25) (advising attorney to withdraw rather than promote "vindictive-
ness").
108. Id. (Rule 2.26) (setting forth situation of"substantial risk of physical or sexual abuse of
a child by the attorney's client" upon which attorney is justified in breaching attorney-client
confidentiality).
109. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratoy Analysis, 1
GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 18 (1987) (asserting that according to traditional concepts, lawyer has
minimal obligations to third parties). Traditionally, to protect their interests, third parties have
had a cause of action under criminal law and for fraud, but not much more. Id.
110. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (suggesting methods of advising students
on diversity of practice). Other professional organizations have promulgated codes of conduct
that similarly reflect the distinct ethic and needs of their practices. See generally THE AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation, Revised Draft
1982); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON MEDIATION SECTION OF FAMILY LAW,
DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (1986).
111. See generally KELLY, supra note 56, at 19-20 (examining five different legal practices and
different cultures that characterize each of them).
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only one type of big business litigation.112  Those tactics do not
ordinarily accompany litigation undertaken on behalf of individuals
in other kinds of cases.113
There are several ways we might convey the diversity of the
profession to our students. One method is to highlight the nature of
the work of lawyers who practice the law we are teaching."4 In a
Corporations course, we can contrast the roles of in-house and
outside counsel, particularly in the area of corporate compliance'15
and examine the role of lawyer as planner;"' in Trusts and Estates,
we can highlight the non-adversarial nature of transactional prac-
tice; 7 in Family Law, we can expose the degree to which non-client
interests (e.g., children) are taken into account by lawyers represent-
ing parents."'8
112. See SOL M. IJNOWITz & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION 82 (1994)
(expressing disappointment in declining reputation of practice of law characterized in part by
contemporary litigation tactics arising from litigation by corporations); Bryant Garth, From Civil
Litigation to PivateJustice: Legal Practice at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
931, 938-44 (1993) (recounting "scorched earth" litigation tactics of 1970s and 1980s).
113. Garth, supra note 112, at 945.
114. Textbook authors are beginning to provide materials from which such lessons may be
drawn. See, ag., HAzARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWERING v-vi (4th ed. 1993).
The materials in the book also reflect the variousness of lawyers' situations in practice.
Some of the cases and rules involve big firm corporate practice. Others involve small
firm lawyers and sole practitioners and such transactions as drafting a will, handling a
divorce or defending a criminal accused. Situation in practice makes a difference in
the kind of matters a lawyer handles and therefore the kind of ethical problems she
encounters... [i]n these respects, lawyers are very different from each other.
Id
In this book we deal with people, the quick as well as the dead. There is nothing like
the death of a moneyed member of the family to show persons as they are, virtuous or
conniving, generous or grasping. Many a family has been torn apart by a botched-up
will. Each case is a drama in human relationships-and the lawyer, as counselor,
draftsman, or advocate, is an important figure in the dramatis personae. This is one
reason the estates practitioner enjoys his work, and why we enjoy ours.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WiLts TRUSTS AND ESTATES xxxiv (5th ed. 1995).
115. A particularly congenial context for this discussion is provided by Graham v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 131 (Del. 1963) (holding that director of corporation had no
knowledge of any facts regarding antitrust activities of corporation employees and is therefore
not liable for failure to take further action).
116. WILLIAm A. KLEIN &J. MARIA RAMSEYER, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS iii-iv (2d ed. 1994).
"[B]ecause lawyers plan at least as often as they litigate, we bring a planner's perspective ....
[We explore how the parties to a case could have avoided the disputes at stake ... we use
corporate debt to ask.., how business executives can structure relationships among their many
investors .... " Id. at iii.
117. See DuKm'INmm & JOHANSON, supra note 114, at xxxiv (highlighting joys of estate
planning). The now well-known example of The Case of the Unwanted Will provides a good
opportunity to explore the dilemmas that arise in this kind of non-adversarial practice. See
Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEx. L. REv. 963, 982-83 (1987)
(recounting Case of the Unwanted Will, an 'estate planning matter exploring ramifications of
decision by attorney to represent entire family, not merely husband and wife as individuals).
118. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text (urging attorney to accord protection to
children's interest while representing parent).
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A second method for conveying the diversity of professional work
to our students is to bring satisfied practitioners into each of our
substantive classes to discuss the nature and culture of their practic-
es. 19 If students were exposed to practitioners across the curricu-
lum, they would have a richer picture of the possibilities for creating
or choosing an identity that is congruent with their character and
their skills. They would also have models of lawyers who had found
satisfaction in their work while maintaining their personal integri-
ty.1
20
A third method to make this diversity more vivid is to build on the
student's own legal experiences. Nearly all of our students do legal
work while in law school, either in clinics, externships, or part-time or
summer employment12 1 In addition, many of them have been
clients. We should encourage them to bring their experiences into
the classroom. We should help them appreciate that they have
already begun to face the issues that will define them as practitio-
ners.1
22
119. SeeJames R. Rest, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Moral Education, in MORAL EDUcATION:
THEORY AND APPLICATION 9-25 (Berkowitz & Oser eds., 1985) [hereinafter MORAL EDUCATION]
(describing interdisciplinary approach to moral education for professional graduate students that
included exposure to respected professionals who are "technically competent" and "successful"
in their careers). "The basic idea is that the students will respect these professionals, aspire to
be like them, and will develop an ideal image of their professional selves not only as technically
competent but also as active moral agents in a wider social world." Id. at 22.
120. The stories of practitioners are often more vivid to the students than their experiences
in class. For several years, I had the privilege of offering my students an opportunity to hear
from a particularly wise and gifted practitioner. He advised them to forsake the ethics rule book
for something he termed "the stomach tightening test." He told them not to do anything as
lawyers that made their stomachs tighten up. Semester after semester, "the stomach tightening
test" appeared in many exam answers as the final arbiter of the students' proposed solution.
There are other teaching materials to use to show praiseworthy, satisfied lawyers. SeeVincent
RobertJohnson, Law-givers, Story-tellers, and Dubin's Legal Heroes: The Emerging Dichotomy in Legal
Ethics, 3 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICs 341,346 (1989) (reviewing Legal Heroes by Lawrence Dubin, a 28-
minute videotape aired on University of Michigan Public Television, WFUM-TV in 1988, which
focuses on three attorneys who pursued "altruistic" careers).
121. DanielJ. Givelber et al., Learning Through Work: An Empirical Study of Legal Internship,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC 1, 4-7 (1995) (citing studies indicating that vast majority of law students
engage in some form of work experience while in law school, either by way of law school clinics
and externships, or though part-time employment during school year or summer).
122. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 67, at 4 (asserting that many students have already
developed images of legal system prior to law school). Implicit in our teaching and in law
school culture are important messages about professional behavior. There are some thoughtful
attempts to utilize the law school experience itself as a basis for exploring the diversity of
professional behavior. My colleague, Professor Rick Greenstein, teaches the introductory six
weeks of his first year Criminal Law class by dividing his dass into small groups to reach
consensus on and draft a disciplinary code for law students. Some of the questions are whether
the code should address the following situations: a student's unwanted following around and
watching of another that has not resulted in provable harm; chtting out an important case from
a reporter, removing a key volume from the library late in the evening; or deliberately
misshelving a required text for a legal writing assignment. See FrankJ. Macchiarola, Teaching in
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The goal of these efforts is to give our students an appreciation of
the profession's diversity so they seek out opportunities to develop as
professionals in ways that comport with their self-conceptions, by
finding a practice that conforms with their own character and
style.123 Imparting a richer sense of the range of practice may also
contribute to students' ability to construct alternative visions of
lawyering so that if they find themselves in a practice that is inhospita-
ble to the values that they hold, they will have the confidence to
challenge it. Cultivating an understanding that there is no single
conception of professional lawyering may assist our students both to
seek and to create alternative visions of practice.
B. Moral Questions Are Difficult
A student recently approached me with what he termed a "dumb"
question. He was working on a moot court brief and had found,
through a Westlaw search, briefs submitted in a case on which he was
relying to make his argument. He wanted to use some of the
arguments from those briefs, but was worried that such use would
violate the Moot Court rules requiring "original" work.
His question was not dumb. Resolution of the question required
a close reading of the Moot Court rules and a clear understanding of
what "originality" means in connection with brief writing (which is
after all an attempt to apply precedent, i.e., preexisting arguments, to
new facts). It was a wonderful example of professional behavior for
him to have recognized the issue and to have had the courage to raise
it. I told him so.
It is my experience that students often think that raising ethical or
moral questions is dumb. They think that because such questions
arise frequently, they must have clear and ready answers. 124  More-
Law Schoo" What We are Doing and What More Has to be Done?, 71 U. DET. MERCy L. REv. 531,538
(1994) (suggesting that law school ethics education should focus on what information to include
on student resumes, how to deal with clinic clients who may not wish to tell truth, how to count
hours for law review service, and when collaboration becomes cheating); Timothy P. Terrell, A
Tour of Whine Country: The Challenge of Extending the Tenets of Lawyer Professionalism to Law Professors
and Law Students, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 16-18 (1994) (proposing that law schools should self-
consciously promote, in classrooms, professional values of excellence, integrity, respect for rule
of law, respect for other lawyers and their work, accountability, and responsibility-for adequate
distribution of legal services).
123. See KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 366-67 (asserting that to find satisfaction, lawyers must
find work that requires powers and capacities that are important to lawyer's self conception,
which bear upon who he is and what he does, and that such qualities must be character traits).
124. Students also feel frustrated when these apparently simple questions do not have clear
answers. We must assist them to explore why the answers are not easy and why those answers
might be different depending on context. I often tell students that although there might be a
wrong answer, there is probably more than one right answer. See infra notes 143-44 and
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over, the problem of thinking that questions of professional behavior
are easy is not limited to students. Faculty who are taken by surprise
by an ethical question or who encounter student questions about an
aspect of their course that never occurred to them approach me
apologetically to ask a "stupid" question. They often assume that they
should already know the answer or that the answer should be
obvious. 125
There is something about the ordinariness and recurrence of many
questions of professional behavior that belies their complexity. We
should encourage students to understand that such questions deserve
attention and respect. Often resolutions are not easy, but require
careful thought and deliberation.
Questions of appropriate professional behavior are not answered
simply, nor are they susceptible of answers a priori. Such questions
require assessments of context, competing values, and one's own
responsibilities. That someone has faced and resolved a similar
question before does not mean that the same answer is appropriate
in a different context, with a different client or for a different lawyer.
Often such questions raise profound issues at the core of our
profession. Two examples will illustrate this point.
Lawyers in practice make mistakes. A relatively common example
is the misdelivery of a privileged document to an opposing party. The
professional responsibility questions are: (i) what the receiving lawyer
should do upon discovering the mistake, i.e., read the document,
return it unread, or turn it over to a judge (if the matter is in
litigation); and (ii) whether the lawyer may make that decision
without consulting the client. These relatively straightforward and
recurring questions have generated ethics opinions, 126 contradictory
court decisions, 127 and scholarly commentary.12  To resolve the
accompanying text (emphasizing that moral decisionmaking requires complex contextualized
judgments made in light of real life situational pressures).
125. I suspect that some faculty actually dismiss ethical questions as trivial to mask their own
confusion or surprise, to spare themselves from feeling that they are "unethical" or "immoral"
for not having recognized the moral dimensions of the problem on their own, or to excuse the
fact that they do not have the answer.
126. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 368 (1992)
(advising attorney, who inadvertently receives confidential material, to return it without
examination); id. Formal Op. 382 (1994) (discussing ease with which technology allows mistakes
to occur); D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 256 (1995); NewJersey Supreme Court Advisory
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 680 (1995), reprinted in 11 ABA/BNA LAwvaas' MANuAL OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 67 (1995) (ruling that attorney must disclose to opposing counsel that
client gained access to papers in briefcase of opposing counsel).
127. Compare Berg Elecs. Inc. v. Molex Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995) (holding
that inadvertent disclosure of documents did not waive attorney-client privilege) with
International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.RD. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988)
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questions, the ABA and the courts have balanced the confidentiality
concerns of the client129 against the duty of diligent representa-
tion."s  The opinions are conflicting, sometimes resulting in the
return of the document and other times not. The ultimate resolution
of the question implicates our deepest notions of what it means to
behave professionally. Are we bound to capitalize on our opponent's
mistakes? Must we defer to our client's wishes on this point? Does
merely raising the question contradict fundamental notions of trust
and shared humanity which ought to characterize our dealings with
others?13'
As another example, a lawyer counsels a client about whether or
not to accept a proffered settlement of a case.3 2  The client,
strapped for funds and nervous about testifying, is inclined to
accept.13 3  The lawyer thinks the offer is inadequate and that the
client's chances of obtaining substantially more money at trial are
excellent." The professional responsibility question is how much
pressure the lawyer should exert to influence the client to follow the
lawyer's recommendation. This relatively straightforward question
(stating that inadvertent production ofdocuments constitutes waiver of attorney-client privilege).
128. See, e.g., Coquillette, supra note 5, at 1276 (recounting instance where attorney
erroneously received and opened opposition's client report). See generally THE COMMrTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING Our OF AN ATTORNEY'S RECEIrT
OF INADVERTENTLY DISCLOSED INFORMATION, repinted in 50 RECORD 660 (1995).
129. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (proscribing revelation of client
information without consent, except under certain circumstances); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) (addressing preservation of client confidences
and secrets); see also supra note 127 (citing cases involving inadvertent disclosure of confidential
documents).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) (requiing reasonable
diligence and prompmess in client representation); see also supra note 127 (citing cases involving
inadvertent disclosure of confidential documents).
131. I have often raised this question of the misdelivered document when showing my
students the videotape "Representing the Corporate Client: The Saga of Albinex, " written by me,
produced by the University of Pennsylvania's Center on Professionalism and published by
Commerce Clearing House (CCH). On one occasion, following a lively discussion in which the
class was evenly split about whether or not to return the document, a student rushed up to me
obviously agitated and upset. He told me that he had a job as a psychological tester of
incarcerated prisoners in which he assessed their pro-social skills (these, he explained, are the
opposite of anti-social skills). A standard question on those tests is what to do if you see a
package lying next to a mailbox. The student went on to explain that even the "lowest
functioning sociopath" faced with that dilemma would not open the package but would put it
in the mailbox. Hewas appalled at the view expressed by many of his classmates that dedication
to client goals compelled the lawyer to read the misdelivered paper. "We are training
sociopaths," was his conclusion. Although his analogy was inexact, he appreciated the
implications of the question raised by the hypothetical.
132. See Sarena Stier, Reframing Legal Skills: Relational Lawoyering, 42J. LEGAL EDUC. 303, 314
(1992) (discussing scenario taken from "Who's In Charge: The Lawyer as Counselor" videotape
produced by Center on Professionalism, University of Pennsylvania Law School).
133. Id
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raises profound issues about the allocation of power in the lawyer-
client relationship. It is a subject that has attracted legal scholar-
ship,' moral philosophy, 36 and writing about practical skills. 7
Although practitioners face this question every day, it is complex and
deserves sustained attention.
The message that professional responsibility questions are profound
and difficult, and that it is professional to raise such questions is one
that every teacher in law school can impart, even if that teacher does
not "know the answer." It is important for our students to be
encouraged to raise and ponder these issues, and to "rehearse""
their conversations about them.
Moreover, it is especially important that all faculty, not just
"professional responsibility" faculty, accord those questions attention
and respect. Through our teaching, we impart messages to our
students about what counts in law. Legal discourse consists primarily
of categorizing ideas. 9 We help our students construct legal
frameworks and place facts and ideas within them. These frameworks
are the lenses through which they view lawyering. If we avoid using
words such as ethical, professional, right, wrong, and truth, we send
a message that those concepts are irrelevant to the enterprise.
14°
135. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 140-43 (explaining that there is often great danger, particularly where
clients have little hope of finding another attorney, that lawyers will force clients to compromise
substantive goals in order to achieve access and participation in judicial process); cf. CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs § 4.3 (1986) (presenting three different models for
viewing lawyer-client relationship: lawyer as "hired gun" for dominant client, lawyer as "master
of the ship," and lawyer-client cooperation).
136. SeeRichardWasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: SomeMorallssues,5 HuM. RTS. 1, 15-16
(1975) (examining accusations that lawyer-client relationship is morally defective one, in which
client is treated with neither dignity nor respect).
137. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 55, at 1-2 (discussing methods of lawyer-client
deliberation that may enable both to notice and resolve moral issues).
138. Hartwell, supra note 57, at 535 (finding that students are likely to respond more
effectively to ethical and moral dilemmas by "rehearsing" how they are going to talk about these
dilemmas).
139. See Henderson, supra note 75, at 1591 (contending that "legal categories," created by
doctrine, statute, or constitution, will define legal discourse and therefore determine what is
relevant).
140. This point is made by those who advocate transforming jurisprudence through
storytelling. SeeJane Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL L REv. 255, 264 (1994).
All legal doctrine functions to limit the factual information that will be brought to bear
on a problem. Just as the law recognizes only limited kinds of stories, law also
recognizes only limited ways of telling stories. Powerful conventions govern how stories
must be told in legal settings; they govern form and language.
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: ThinkingAbout Law As Language, 87 MICH. L REV.
2459, 2483 (1989) ("If language is intimately bound up with the way we think about experience,
then talking about experience in a different language necessarily entails knowing that
experience in a somewhat different way."). Paradoxically, the point is also made by those who
are skeptical about narrative jurisprudence. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories
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If we take our students' moral questions seriously and show them
that there is a place in legal discourse and lawyering for those
concerns, 14 1 we help them find the courage to raise such concerns
in practice, where the environment for such conversations may be less
congenial. 14
C. Find a Mentor
We know our students will encounter troubling ethical questions.
The best advice we can give them is to find a mentor, someone who
experiences the world as they do and with whom they can raise their
concerns. Moral questions cannot be resolved without considering
the context in which they arise."' Moreover, the development of
moral judgment requires experiential, complex decisionmaking in the
real world. Any answers that we give students to their hypothetical
dilemmas in law school necessarily lack the rich context and variables
that such dilemmas present in real life. Accordingly, the best advice
we can offer beginning lawyers is to find someone with whom to talk
when those dilemmas do arise, so that the culture, politics, and other
important factors can be addressed in context.
44
Out of School- An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 809 (1993).
141. I do not mean to overlook the importance of faculty raising moral questions on their
own without the input of students. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. My point,
however, is that when our students raise such issues, particularly when we are not expecting
those questions or when the moral dimensions of the problem had not occurred to us, that we
take them seriously and treat such questions with respect even if we do not have a ready answer
for them.
142. This point is documented in Professor Lawrence Hellman's study on the formation of
professional values. The study found that the students in clinical placements who had an
opportunity to raise and discuss their professional responsibility concerns with supervising faculty
had two important experiences. Hellman, supra note 3, at 608. First, they were confronted with
their own individual responsibility for their actions; and second, they became emboldened to
speak up to supervisors in their work settings if they felt a matter was being inappropriately
handled. I& at 608-10.
143. See Hartwell, supra note 57, at 530 (suggesting that people have inherent capacity to
develop moral reasoning when provided with appropriate environment); Martha Minow &
Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL L. REv. 1597, 1603 (1990) (asserting that moral
decisions cannot be reached by simply figuring out which moral rule applies to situation at
hand, because process of formulating and stating such rules erases critical contextual details).
144. Critics of the current state of professional life often point to the disappearance of
mentoring as one cause of declining values. See, e.g., Aspen, supra note 23, at 518 (observing
that notion of apprenticeship in which etiquette and other "traditions of civility" are passed
down from one generation of lawyers to next, is virtually nonexistent today); Graham C. Lilly,
Law Schools Wiout Lartyers? Wnds of Change in LegalEducation, 81 VA. L. REv. 1421, 1447 (1995)
(explaining that as large law firms increasingly place premium on efficiency, "one-on-one
instruction" by partners and senior associates has declined greatly because such time is neither
billable nor directed at expanding clientele); Linowitz & Mayer, supra note 13, at 97 (describing
nostalgically "children's hour," an open bar in library of major Washington, D.C. law firm at 6:00
p.m., where partners felt that it was part of their professional duty to talk regularly with new
associates about their work); see also John F. Dolan & Russell A. McNairJr., Teaching Commercial
"SIMPLE TRUTHs" ABOUT MORAL EDUCATION
Engaging in moral dialogue is an essential ingredient of moral
growth. Studies and theorists suggest that moral development
requires participation in an appropriate environment, characterized
by engaging and active moral discourse."5 The process of locating
a mentor and engaging such a person in dialogue about moral issues
is itself a professionally responsible act. Encouraging our students to
find and rely on a mentor is one of the best techniques we can offer
them for navigating the workplace. 46
Several people with whom I have discussed this point have asked
me to suggest how our students should go about finding mentors,
particularly because this Article assumes that many workplaces will be
characterized by pressures that hinder reflective, professional
behavior. In such environments, say my colleagues, it may be difficult
to find an appropriate mentor.47 I have thought about why this
does not seem to be a problem to me. In part, I suppose it is because
I personally know so many thoughtful and decent people who have
chosen to be lawyers and who would be honored to be asked about
questions concerning professional practice. In my experience, the
morale problem" that is affecting our profession is of great con-
cern to most practicing lawyers who would welcome the opportunity
to do something about it, by helping a new colleague.
Law in the Third Year: A Short Report on a Business Organization and Commercial Law Clinic, 45 J.
LEGAL EDuc. 283, 284 (1995) (describing reports of practitioners that opportunities for
mentoring are less than in other times).
145. James R. Elkins, Dificulties in TalkingEthics, 17 VT. L. REV. 353, 373 (1993); see Hartwell,
supra note 57, at 530 (stating that appropriate environment for moral growth requires students
to reveal their moral positions to themselves and others). SeegenerallyWolfgang Edelstein, Moral
Intervention: A Skeptical Note; in MORAL EDUCATION, supra note 119, at 387, 392-96 (stating that
model of ordinary teaching is at odds with requirements of moral discourse, which entails
equality among parties, unconstrained dialogue and dissent, and freely consensual participation
by everyone, which implies right to withdraw from further dialogue at any time); Wangerin,
supra note 57, at 1284 (describing theory of Norma Haan that moral development occurs
through "a process of engaging in dialogues with other affected individuals").
146. As a start, we should see ourselves as mentors of our students in law school. An
important component of this mentoring process is to take their moral questions seriously. See
supra notes 14142 and accompanying text.
147. My colleagues may be right. Professor Hellman's study of students' clinical work
experiences in law school found that a "significant portion of the students' law office mentors
display disinterest or discomfort in discussing the concerns that are felt by the students when
they observe or are even directly impacted by a practitioner's orjudge's inappropriate conduct."
Hellman, supra note 3, at 543. This is a distressing conclusion. Perhaps the student supervisors
in Professor Hellman's study did not perceive input into the students' professional development
to be part of their role. Indeed, Professor Hellman suggests that many aspects of supervision
and instruction were inadequate. Hellman, supra note 3, at 543; see also Aaronson, supra note
60, at 1400 (stating that opportunity to work with "rare individual who may embody the qualities
of the lawyer-statesman" is highly unlikely today, given bar's dramatic increase in size and
proliferation of specialties).
148. See KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 2 (perceiving that legal profession faces "spiritual crisis"
and proposing revival of lawyer-statesman ideal).
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I think there is a more subtle reason for my optimism as well.
From my experience teaching and talking about professionalism and
ethics to practicing lawyers around the country,149 I believe that
most lawyers maintain a core of idealism. They are not happy about
the commercial pressures -that they see transforming the profession.
Even those who submit to the pressures in their practices are not
comfortable about it. When these lawyers confront issues of profes-
sionalism in a less pressured environment, where there is an opportu-
nity for reflection, they commonly argue for a less self-serving or more
idealistic position. Moreover, in that environment, they are open to
considering the moral dimensions of their work. Accordingly, I
believe that the process of being asked to reflect on someone else's
dilemma, and of being required to articulate and explain reasons for
behavior, will influence many practitioners to respond thoughtfully.
In a recent article, Bryant Garth, Director of the American Bar
Foundation, made a similar observation in his discussion of litigation
reform. 5 ° In that article, he described the explosion since the
1970s of "scorched earth" business litigation, that is, litigation
undertaken to gain tactical competitive advantage.' Lawyers
conducting such litigation have tended to engage in aggressive,
adversarial tactics, in particular, abusive and burdensome discov-
ery. 52  He suggested that one place to look for reform efforts
directed toward such litigation is to the organized activity of those
same lawyers in professional associations.1 53 Lawyers, he said, have
internalized the value of engaging in such law reform activities, and
many believe that such service enhances their stature as profession-
als. "[T]he organized profession has acted as a restraint on its
own membership.., because lawyers have become eminent through
professional service. "15 I believe that the same drive that animates
lawyers to seek publicly to reform practices in which they engage
privately also motivates lawyers who are asked for advice on ethical or
other professional matters. I think many lawyers, when asked to
reflect on practices that may not conform to their internalized sense
149. For three years, I created materials and taught Continuing Legal Education in Ethics
and Professionalism as an associate of the University of Pennsylvania's Center on Professional-
ism. During that time I taught classes for several thousand practicing lawyers.
150. Garth, supra note 112, at 955-56 (finding that membership in professional associations
requires lawyers to advance "universal principles" upon which legal profession is based).
151. Garth, supra note 112,-at 94045.
152. Garth, supra note 112, at 942.
153. Garth, supra note 112, at 945-49.
154. Garth, supra note 112, at 955-56.
155. Garth, supra note 112, at 959.
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of decency or tojustify unprofessional practice that may have become
commonplace, will be reluctant to encourage those practices in
others. If our students have the moral courage to speak up and
search for mentors, they will find them, and together the students and
mentors may engage in a dialogue that promotes moral growth of
both groups.156
D. It Is Important for Students to Be Who They Are
There is empirical and anecdotal evidence that law school encour-
ages students to suspend their personal notions of morality. Some
suggest that law school transforms students from ordinarily moral
people, who experience moral feelings and make moral judgments for
themselves, into people who become resistant to taking personal
moral responsibility for their own actions.157 Another characteriza-
tion is that we induce our students to shed a non-legal identity, one
that encompasses emotional and moral thinking, and to assume an
objective mechanical stance."5 8 Adding to that disassociation, some
of us assume that our students' personal morality will often conflict
with their responsibilities as lawyers. Consequently, we suggest that to
be effective they will be required to abandon or compromise their
ordinary morality. 59
We should self-consciously try to give our students "permission" to
be who they are and to convey to them that they will be better lawyers
as a result."6 We should not further contribute to the disassociation
156. See THE MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 3, at 205 (suggesting that part of skill of
"recognizing and resolving ethical dilemmas" includes critically evaluating ethical propriety of
practices confronting lawyers and consulting other lawyers in process of that critical evaluation).
157. See GPANFiELD, supra note 12, at 200 (noting that at both Harvard and Northeastern law
schools, students grew to perceive world with "detached cynicism," abandoning their original
principles ofjustice);JACK & JACK, supra note 12, at 95-129 (finding that one way lawyers cope
with strain between personal morality and professional obligation is to suppress that very
tension); Cramton, supra note 73, at 262 (arguing that most law school curricula teach values
which conflict with beliefs and attitudes central to most peoples' lives); Timothy L. Hall, Moral
Character, The Practice of Law, and Legal Education, 60 MISS. L.J. 511, 535-41 (1990) (noting that
law students have often been viewed as "moral skeletons," stripped of moral faculties and
dispositions that give life substance); GeraldJ. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics,
55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 76-81 (1980) (observing that lawyers, who may need to distance themselves
psychologically from arguments they make on behalf of their clients, incorporate that
detachment into their self-concept leading to deep moral skepticism).
158. See David R. Culp, Law Schook A Mortuary For Poets and Moral Reason, 16 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 61, 79-87 (1994) (asserting that law school experience teaches students to divorce emotion
from rational thought).
159. See Postema, supra note 157, at 76 n.35 (explaining traditional conception that there is
sharp distinction between lawyer's private and professional life).
160. ProfessorJack Sammons terms this process "professing lawyering" and describes it in
rich detail. Jack L. Sammons, Jr., Professing: Some Thoughts on Professionalism and Classroom
Teaching, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 609, 615-22 (1990) (terming process of self-consciously
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our students experience between who they were before and after they
went to law school. Instead, we should attempt to reveal the moral
tension that underlies disputes, encouraging students to apply their
natural moral sense to their resolution.
61
A particularly congenial way to highlight the underlying moral
dimension of legal disputes is to utilize a transactional perspec-
tive. 62 By this I mean to shift the perspective from the impartial
decisionmaker to the parties, and to focus on events as the matter
unfolds rather than after it is complete. This shift to a transactional
perspective brings the roles of the lawyers and parties more sharply
into focus and highlights the choices and decisions made by each.
Teaching in this manner may entangle us in arguments about
moral relativism. 63 It need not do so, however, because solutions
permitting students to be themselves as "professing lawyering" and further describing this
process). This manner of teaching is movingly portrayed in SHAFER & COCHRAN, supra note
55, at 113-34; see also Stephen L Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence andEthics of Laryering, 104YALE L.J. 1545, 1598-1609 (1995) (describing examples
of such dialogue with clients).
161. See Sammons, supra note 160, at 617-20 (describing "good teacher" as one who shows
students that both sides of legal dispute have valid claims to students' moral allegiance).
162. SeeWangerin, supra note 57, at 1282-83 n.171 (suggesting that best method for exposing
students to moral issues is to restructure lawschool classes to focus on future and away from past
and toward litigation and negotiation and compromise). A description of "Integrated
Transactional Practice," an integrated course in Trusts and Estates, Professional Responsibility,
and Interviewing, Negotiation and Counseling, which I co-teach with Professor Nancy Knauer
at Temple University Law School, will be the subject of a forthcoming article. The course, which
centers around simulated Trusts and Estates client matters raising professional responsibility
questions, provides a realistic, concrete, and effective context for exploring the moral
dimensions of lawyering. See Teresa Stanton Collett, And the Two Shall Become as One... Until
the Lawyers Are Done, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLYl 101, 119-43 (1993) (discussing
moral dilemmas involved with estate planning in context of transactional practice).
163. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the competing claims of relativism,
skepticism, and universalism. See Wangerin, supra note 57, at 1240-41 (describing differing
approaches to understanding nature of truth). I am squarely in the camp of those who believe
that contextualized inquiry and open discussion of problems from multiple perspectives need
not undermine the foundations for the exercise ofjudgment nor incapacitate us from reaching
a decision. See Minow & Spelman, supra note 143, at 1620-21 (concluding that viewing issues in
context does not necessarily result in loss of ability to make reasoned judgments); Sammons,
supra note 160, at 617 (finding that "good teaching" need not be value neutral). I take this
position largely for pragmatic reasons. Respecting our students' notions of morality and working
within them is the only effective way I have found to teach. In my experience, students view as
patronizing most pronouncements from professors concerning how they should behave. See
Hall, supra note 157, at 545-46 (asserting that law professors are probably not very effective at
indoctrination, and, in any event, ought to be teaching approach to legal ethics not particular
model of virtuous lawyer); Kleinberger, supra note 7, at 380 (noting that exhortation from
professors is not way to foster moral understanding because law school is "purposefully hostile
to faith, intuition and feeling" and because it is practically impossible to "orate people" into
sense of morality). The method I use to ground these discussions is to suggest that we begin
with an examination of values embodied in the Model Rules such as loyalty to clients, keeping
confidences, respect for client autonomy, and candor to the court. The difficult questions arise
when those values conflict with each other or with our internal values. The Preamble to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct states:
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to dilemmas may emerge from a shared moral consensus. 64 Where
there is no consensus, we can still acknowledge that some answers are
better than others. I tell my students that while I may be able to
identify some answers that I believe are wrong, there is often more
than one right answer."
Giving our students "permission" to be themselves in law school
allows them to see that the enterprise of lawyering is not disconnected
from ordinary life. 66  Providing the opportunity to bring their
personal notions of morality to bear on resolving professional
problems is an important method to make that connection vivid. It
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's responsibili-
ties to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in remaining an
upright person while earning a satisfactory living.... Within the framework of these
rules many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues must be
resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by
the basic principles underlying the Rules.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Preamble (1995). Examination of the manner in
which each of us resolves those values conflicts exposes our individual preferences and norms
and brings us face to face with the necessity of makingjudgments. This process exposes both
the moral dimension of lawyering and the framework within which we make decisions.
164. See Sammons, supra note 160, at 617 (finding that teaching by searching for shared
morality does not have to foster "vulgar moral relativism"); Hall, supra note 157, at 543 (arguing
that law professors should seek moral consensus with students by "extrapolating from [moral]
intuitions on which they agree").
165. To assist our students in their moral deliberations, I do not think it is productive to
suggest ambiguity where there is signifigant clarity, either by law or by shared professional
consensus. Destroying relevant documents after an investigation has commenced, backdating
or otherwise altering subpoenaed documents, and lying to regulators are all actions that are
plainly wrong by the standards of our criminal law and the profession. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 4910 (1983) (criminalizing destruction of any record or document to impair its
availability in pending investigation and prohibiting alteration of record or document to impair
its veracity); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 3.4 (1983) (stating that lawyer
should not unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal document or other material having potential
evidentiary value); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
375 (1993) (setting forth lawyer's obligation to disclose information adverse to client in context
of bank examination); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUGT Rule 4.1 (1983) (stating that
lawyer is required to be truthful when making material statement of fact or law to third person).
Sometimes our students do not appreciate that certain issues are more settled than others. If
we do not elucidate the boundaries for them, however, they have no standard by which to
measure the less clear questions.
My students laugh when I tell them that they may not kill off a witness in the name of zealous
representation even if that witness is going to testify in a way that will severely hurt their client.
Nevertheless, this example is useful for when they confront the question of the propriety of a
misleading discovery response. Is such a response more akin to killing a harmful witness or to
framing testimony in the most favorable light for the client, the latter being an ethically
appropriate activity? I sometimes begin classes by asking students what behavior would clearly
violate the Rules. We can usually come to a class consensus in several areas, which then serve
as points of reference for the rest of the hour.
166. SeePaul Bergman et al., Leamingfrom Experience: Nonlegally-Specfie Role Plays, 37J. LEGAL
EDUC. 535, 539-43 (1987) (finding that use of non-legal role playing in law school classes can
fill "experience gap" left by traditional classes and clinical programs).
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imparts a message that there is a place for them in the profession that
utilizes their personal moral preferences and styles.
All of the foregoing themes emerge from an acknowledgement that
the practice of law is diverse-diverse in the nature of work, diverse
in the people who practice, and diverse in the variety of circumstances
that bear on the resolution of important professional questions. The
approach to values education in law school that I suggest here is
designed to prepare our students for the workplace pressures and
forces that they will encounter. It seems to me to be the proper focus
for our educational efforts.
CONCLUSION
As we realize the importance of workplace experiences in influenc-
ing ethical behavior, we must take account of that reality in our
teaching. Our goal should be to assist our students in developing
tools and skills, such as moral courage, to navigate the pressures of
the workplace. This courage includes not simply the fortitude to
withstand pressures to behave unprofessionally once they are in
practice," but also the desire to bring their best moral selves into
their working lives. Understanding that the practice of law is not
unitary and that there is a place within our diverse profession for
them to be themselves, taking moral and ethical questions seriously,
finding someone to talk to, and respecting their own moral and
emotional judgments seem to me to be important messages that we
can all begin to share with our students in the service of a more
honorable, fulfilling, and humane professional life.
167. See Robert M. Cover, Violece and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 1611 (1986) ("It is one
thing to understand what ought to be done, quite another thing to do it. Doing entails an act
of will and may require courage and perseverance. In the case of an individual's actions, we
think such qualities are functions of motivation, character, and psychology.").
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